This article begins with describing the decades-old struggle by South Africa's most senior prosecutors to be independent of executive interference.
interference in their affairs. 5 Between 1926 and 1992, successive ministers of justice effectively controlled the attorneys-general, the country's most senior prosecutors, whose powers extended largely along provincial lines. 6 In 1992, the Attorney-General Act 7 sought to ensure that attorneys-general functioned independently of the executive. In terms of the Act, the authority to institute prosecutions became the sole responsibility of the attorneys-general and their delegates, free of ministerial interference. The ANC successfully pushed for a constitutional provision to establish a national prosecuting authority for South Africa, whose head would be appointed by the president. 10 The constitutionality of the provision was challenged by a number of provincial attorneysgeneral at the time, on the grounds that it impinged on the separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary. 11 The Constitutional Court rejected this objection, arguing that the prosecuting authority is not part of the judiciary, and that the appointment of its head by the president does not in itself contravene the doctrine of the separation of powers.
12
Fears about the NPA's independence from political interference revolved around two related concerns, with the first being the power of the executive -that of the minister of justice in particular -to influence and interfere with the function of the country's chief prosecutor, the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP). 13 Second, the centralised and hierarchical nature of the NPA endowed the NDPP with considerable power over the provincial Directors of Public Prosecutions (DPPs) and, by implication, all prosecutors in the country. 14 For example, the NDPP has the authority to intervene in the prosecution process when policy directives are not complied with, 15 and to review a decision to prosecute or not prosecute, after 'consulting' the relevant DPPs (i.e. the NDPP can overrule his deputies, provided consultation has taken place). 16 In 1998, then president Nelson Mandela's appointment of Bulelani Ngcuka as the NPA's first head raised concerns among the General Council of the Bar and opposition parties that the NDPP would be a partisan political appointee. 17 Ngcuka, relatively unknown prior to his appointment, had served as ANC Chief Whip in the National Council of Provinces, following earlier work on the ANC Constitutional
Committee and with the United Democratic Front.
Ngcuka was, however, well regarded across the political spectrum and considered a hard worker and consensus-builder.
Immediate challenges, new priorities
On assuming his post in mid-1998 -initially with no staff or even a national office -Ngcuka faced three fundamental challenges: 18 winning the respect and allegiance of senior prosecutors, many of whom had been appointed during the apartheid era and who had opposed the creation of a centralised prosecution service; raising morale and productivity among junior prosecutors; and building public confidence in the new prosecuting authority.
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Some of these challenges were acute. The NPA inherited a fragmented, provincially-based and poorly remunerated prosecution corps, with some offices close to collapse. 20 For example, between 1994
and 1997 some 630 prosecutors -approximately a third of the total number of prosecutors at the time -resigned countrywide. 21 Between them they had the equivalent of more than 2 000 years of work experience as prosecutors, and their departure inevitably lowered the average experience level of prosecutors.
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The establishment of the NPA coincided with a shift in priorities for the criminal justice system. 23 From 1994 through 1997, government leaders in the justice sector had focused on the transformation of the police and the criminal justice system more broadly. Their goal was to make the justice system more responsive to community concerns, more accountable and democratic, and more focused on some of the underlying drivers of crime, especially socio-economic deprivation.
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By 1998, however, with concern about rising violent crime spreading to virtually all communities, condemnation of the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system was widespread. In response, the government adopted a more aggressive approach to combating crime through robust and visible policing, tougher bail laws, severe punishment of criminal offenders, and new enforcement tools to deal with organised crime. 25 This resulted in a massive increase in arrests and cases of criminal investigations referred to court by the police for prosecutors' attention.
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The NPA responded to these challenges in a variety of ways. 43 Instead of prosecuting cases in court, the community prosecutor's mission was to reduce and prevent crime, and build relationships and collaborate with the community. The primary suspect in the NPA's investigation was Schabir Shaik, a businessman and financial advisor to then deputy president Jacob Zuma. 61 His brother, Chippy Shaik, was in charge of arms acquisitions at the Department of Defence, which allowed Schabir
Innovation and specialisation
Shaik to bid on a lucrative contract to supply
Corvettes to the South African Navy. 62 It subsequently transpired that Schabir Shaik was believed to have had a corrupt relationship with Zuma, and that the latter was also a suspect in the investigation. 63 In Pikoli's suspension. 75 Pikoli's dismissal had a chilling effect on the NPA and was a deeply demoralising experience for prosecutors who saw in him a disciplined and principled leader. 76 The political meddling in the affairs of the NPA by the country's executive, and the impact this had on the organisation, is a matter of public record. The various machinations are sufficiently numerous and complex to fill a book. 77 Space does not permit a detailed exposition here; suffice to make the following abbreviated points:
• Ngcuka was NDPP for six years (the law provides for a 10-year tenure for an NDPP). 78 After his departure, the NPA entered a period of instability, infighting and public controversy, all of which continue to this day. Since August 2004, the NPA has had six different NDPPs (of which three served in an acting capacity) 79 -an average of less than two years per NDPP or acting NDPP.
This led to numerous changes in the strategy and organisational priorities of the NPA.
• Within the NPA's senior leadership, pro-Mbeki and pro-Zuma factions developed, affecting staff morale and unduly influencing senior appointments and promotions. 80 Often a form of institutional stalemate ensued with numerous senior positions filled by 'acting' appointees who lacked the security permanent appointment would provide. This state of affairs has had an arguably debilitating effect on the NPA's organisational effectiveness, and diverted institutional energy to internecine conflicts at the expense of focusing on the organisation's mission.
• As a consequence of, inter alia, the DSO's success in investigating, among others, senior
MPs implicated in the 'Travelgate' scandal, 81 and politicians involved in the arms deal, notably Zuma and Selebi, the enthusiasm the ruling party's members of Parliament and the executive held for the DSO 'waned substantially'. 82 This resulted in the disbandment of the DSO and the loss of a significant crime-fighting tool in the NPA's armoury.
• On application of the opposition Democratic Alliance, the Constitutional Court found that Menzi In terms of section 4 of the Attorney-General Act, an attorney-general needed to vacate his office only on attaining the age of 65 years (unless the president extended this for a maximum of two years). Moreover, an attorney-general could be suspended and removed from office, by the president or at the request of both houses of Parliament in the same session, only on the grounds of misconduct, continued illhealth or incapacity to carry out his duties of office efficiently.
In an instance where the president suspended an attorneygeneral, both houses of Parliament could overrule the president's suspension. 13 While the Constitution endows the prosecuting authority with considerable functional and legal independence from the executive, there is room for ambiguity in the way the relevant constitutional provisions are to be interpreted. Section 179(2) of the Constitution empowers the prosecuting authority 'to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state' and 'to carry out any necessary functions incidental to instituting criminal proceedings'. Moreover, section 179(4) demands that prosecutors exercise their functions 'without fear, favour or prejudice'. Section 179(5) implies that the NDPP is on an equal footing with the minister of justice, as the NDPP must determine prosecuting policy 'in concurrence' with the minister. That is, while the minister has to consent to any policy that is to come into effect, the minister cannot unilaterally impose his will on the NDPP. On the other hand, section 179(6) contains an ambiguous provision that the minister of justice is 'responsible for the administration of justice' and 'must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting authority'. This seemingly undermines some of the prosecuting authority's independence. Moreover, section 179(1)(a) provides that the NDPP is appointed by the president in his capacity as 'head of the national executive'.
14 Bekker, National or super attorney-general, 27. 58 The data has been compiled from various annual reports produced by the NPS (http://www.npa.gov.za/) and, before 1999, by the Department of Justice (the latter are on file with the author).
